

## India

## IPO Details

Issue opens	03/12/2025
Issue closes	05/12/2025
Total issue size (Rsm)	54,212
OFS (Rsm)	11,712
Price band (Rs)	105-111
Face value (Rs)	1
Implied market cap. (Rsm) (Lower band)	4,76,176
Implied market cap. (Rsm) (Upper band)	5,00,958

## Meesho

## Complex economics of value e-commerce

- Value e-commerce caps margin; Valmo's efficiencies flow back to sellers; scale benefits limited in near term with reliance on ad revenue for margin expansion.
- Ad expenses to stay elevated; ad revenue gains to aid growth, but EBITDA at -6.2% with margin recovery only gradual via scale and tech-led efficiencies.
- Strong seller flywheel; high efficiency & FCF; Valmo's optimised shipping + tech edge but value e-commerce margin tight; recommend subscribing to IPO.

## Value e-commerce hinges on passing optimisation benefits to sellers

Meesho operates a zero-commission, value e-commerce model where most efficiency gains are redirected to sellers to keep prices low. Its revenue base, largely logistics fees, advertising, and mall charges, sits on a structurally thin margin profile because logistics optimisation is mostly passed through. This keeps Meesho competitive in the price-sensitive value segment but also makes unit economics harder to expand.

## Scaling Valmo and generating ad revenue to decide profitability

Valmo's optimisation, despite its 0.5–11% lower shipping costs vs peers, is unlikely to materially lift EBITDA margin in the near term, making advertising revenue growth the key driver of eventual PAT breakeven. New initiatives such as lending and local grocery remain too small to move the needle, and with EBITDA still at -6.2% in FY25, profitability will hinge on scale-led efficiencies and sustained ad monetisation rather than logistics gains alone.

## Downfall of Trell raises concerns on social commerce model

The downfall of Trell (a content-led discovery platform) marks a broader industry reality, India has struggled to replicate the seamless content-to-commerce conversion seen in China and Southeast Asia. As Meesho increasingly relies on content-led discovery and advertising for monetisation, Trell's trajectory serves as a cautionary reminder that building a durable social-commerce flywheel remains structurally challenging in the Indian market.

## E-commerce is a crowded market, with elephants in the room

Meesho's asset-light value e-commerce model differs from Amazon and Flipkart, but it also forces the platform to pass on most optimisation gains to sellers to preserve its low-price positioning. While Amazon launched **Amazon Bazaar** and Flipkart introduced **Shopsy**, neither has matched Meesho's traction, given the fundamentally different customer bases and higher cost operating structures.

## We assign SUBSCRIBE rating to Meesho's IPO for short-term gains

Because value e-commerce unit economics remain structurally complex, Meesho will likely need more time to optimise Valmo's supply chain while continuing to pass on most efficiency gains to sellers, keeping profitability a longer-term outcome. That said, Meesho's differentiated model, supported by its asset-light logistics network and Valmo's optimisation engine, gives it meaningful headroom to scale. If the platform can strike the right balance between margin expansion and seller-side affordability, driven by scale, stronger ad monetisation, and disciplined cost control, it could mirror the trajectory of global value e-commerce leaders like Pinduoduo and Shopee. We assign SUBSCRIBE rating to Meesho's IPO for short-term gains, supported by an attractive valuation at 5.3x market capitalisation/sales. However, over the long run, value e-commerce will continue to face structural challenges. Achieving sustainable EBITDA breakeven remains a distant objective, given the inherent complexity of balancing supply-chain optimisation with passing on benefits to sellers, scaling ad-led monetisation, and preserving Meesho's sharp price positioning.

## Research Analyst(s)



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Financial summary	Mar-23A	Mar-24A	Mar-25F
Revenue (Rsm)	57,345	76,151	93,899
EBITDA (Rsm)	-18,037	-4,941	-5,785
EBITDA margin	-31.5%	-6.5%	-6.2%
Net Profit (Rsm)	-16,719	-3,276	-39,417
Core EPS (Rs)	-4.4	-0.9	-10.0
EV/Sales (x)	8.7	6.6	5.3

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

## Business overview

Meesho's current model marks a pivot from its earlier reseller-driven approach, shifting in 2021 to a full-fledged horizontal marketplace that sells directly to consumers. This transition fundamentally redefined the company's economics, competitive arena, and long-term scalability.

Meesho now operates a multi-sided marketplace that tries to solve a familiar problem in Indian e-commerce. Most consumers want low prices, most small sellers want reach without heavy platform charges, and logistics partners want predictable volume. The company uses a technology stack built for scale to match these interests and create a low friction marketplace. Its platform brings together consumers, sellers, logistics partners, and content creators, with each group drawn in by a different incentive. The result is a large funnel of transacting users and order volumes that placed Meesho at the top of the Indian market by orders and annual transacting users in the 12-month period ended Jun 2025.

The core of the model is a value-focused proposition. The company aims to make online commerce affordable and accessible to a broad base of Indian consumers by holding to an everyday low-price philosophy. **A zero-commission structure and a fulfilment system that relies on scale-driven efficiencies lower the effective cost of participation for sellers.** This has encouraged a wide assortment of unbranded goods, regional labels, and national brands to list on the marketplace. On the consumer side, Meesho relies on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) tools to personalise discovery and create an experience that mirrors offline browsing. The company believes that lowering search costs and improving engagement will keep users on the platform and drive repeat purchases.

Figure 1: Revenue funnel (shipping income and advertisements are the largest contributors)





Figure 2: Transaction model



## Stakeholders

### Consumers ➤

For Meesho, the consumer base is both its greatest asset and its biggest execution test, a rapidly expanding pool of value-driven shoppers, overwhelmingly from outside India's top metro cities, whose preferences are fragmented, price-anchored and shaped by regional nuance. The platform's surge in Annual Transacting Users (ATU), from roughly 175m to over 234m in just one year, with a consistent majority of women shoppers signals that Meesho is not merely participating in India's e-commerce expansion but also driving it.

Yet, serving this cohort requires solving for low-trust, low AOVs, vernacular behaviour, and device constraints, all the while keeping acquisition costs in check. The company's strategy, relentlessly lowering seller costs to keep prices attractive, expanding an enormous long-tail assortment, and leaning heavily on discovery tools, personalisation, rich content, and intuitive multilingual search, has increased order volume even as AOV declines.

If Meesho can maintain engagement, lift order frequency, and keep its cost-to-serve under control, this broad and fast-growing consumer base offers the depth and repeatability necessary for long-term value creation; if not, the very characteristics that fuel its growth could compress margins and constrain its path to profitability.

Figure 3: Meesho largely serves four stakeholders




Figure 4: Cost of products spread across categories





Figure 5: Category mix of placed orders (%)



SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

## Sellers ➤

Sellers form the supply engine that ultimately determines whether its value e-commerce model scales or stalls. The platform's seller base, ranging from manufacturers and wholesalers to small traders has expanded meaningfully, topping 700,000 Annual Transacting Sellers (ATS) in the 12 months ended Sep 2025, while NMV per seller grew at a healthy double-digit CAGR.

What draws sellers in is not altruism but economics, a large and fast-growing consumer market, dramatically lower cost-to-sell relative to peers, and a zero-commission structure that makes low-priced Stock-Keeping Units (SKUs) commercially viable online. Meesho's decision not to run private labels or inventory removes channel conflict, creating a transparent marketplace where visibility is driven by price, quality and relevance rather than preferential treatment. At the same time, simplified onboarding, automated catalogue creation, no Goods and Services Tax (GST) registration for eligible sellers, and increasingly sophisticated advertising tools reduce friction, particularly for the long tail of small and semi-formal businesses.

As long as Meesho continues to offer superior unit economics and fast demand discovery, evident in the steep fall in time-to-first-order, its supply depth and assortment will keep compounding; if its cost advantage narrows or seller profitability deteriorates, the platform risks weakening the very supply-side network effect that underpins its long-term value.

Figure 6: Seller growth on Meesho

NMV retention per seller cohort				
Cohort	Year 0	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3
Fiscal 2022	1.00x	2.21x	2.74x	3.30x
Fiscal 2023	1.00x	3.16x	4.83x	
Fiscal 2024	1.00x	3.34x		
Fiscal 2025	1.00x			

Orders received per seller cohort				
Cohort	Year 0	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3
Fiscal 2022	1.00x	2.37x	3.13x	4.01x
Fiscal 2023	1.00x	3.38x	5.46x	
Fiscal 2024	1.00x	3.52x		
Fiscal 2025	1.00x			

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

## Logistics partners ➤


Meesho's logistics partners represent a decisive layer of its marketplace, the infrastructure that determines whether rising order volume translates into reliable fulfilment (revenue and passing on the benefit to the sellers) or margin leakage.

Operating in a market dominated by small, fragmented players with chronically underutilised assets, Meesho has positioned itself as a demand aggregator, driving the **highest shipment volume in Indian e-commerce and accounting for nearly a third of the industry's shipments in fiscal 2025**.

Its orchestration platform, Valmo, knits together first-mile operators, last-mile delivery agents, sorting centres, truckers and end-to-end logistics partners into a coordinated network, lowering barriers for those who lack integrated capabilities and expanding their accessible Total Addressable Market (TAM). For partners, the incentive is straightforward: Meesho provides scale, predictability and monetisable utilisation - conditions rare in an unorganised logistics ecosystem. The growth in Active Logistics Providers and Valmo Delivery Agents reflects this pull.

Logistics is the keystone that converts Meesho's low-AOV, high-volume model into a viable operating structure; as long as the platform can continue offering its partners consistent volume and easy-to-integrate technology, it sustains the fulfilment capacity needed for growth.

Figure 7: Shipped orders via Valmo



SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

Figure 8: Working diagram of Valmo



## Self-reinforcing flywheels

Meesho's platform economics hinge on a set of mutually reinforcing flywheels that tie its four stakeholder groups, consumers, sellers, logistics partners, and content creators into a single compounding system of scale. The commerce flywheel begins with consumers who are attracted by a vast, frequently refreshed, low-priced assortment; as Annual Transacting Users expanded to 234m in the 12 months ended Sep 2025, order volume surged, pulling in over 706,000 transacting sellers and pushing NMV per seller up, at a nearly 17% CAGR.

Higher seller participation deepens assortment, tightens pricing, and brings in even more consumers, strengthening the loop. The logistics flywheel layers on top of this: rising order volume improves capacity utilisation for Meesho's 18,098 Active Logistics Providers and more than 102,000 Valmo Delivery Agents, driving down per-order fulfilment costs and enabling sellers to profitably list even lower-value SKUs. Valmo, Meesho's orchestration layer, has scaled from just 1.83% of shipped orders in FY23 to 48.08% in FY25 and 64.52% in the six months ended Sep 2025, effectively expanding the addressable market for fragmented logistics players who lacked end-to-end capability. Lower logistics costs feed back into lower prices, strengthening the seller and consumer loops.

A third flywheel, content commerce, adds an additional accelerant: creators join Meesho to monetise their content, improving product discovery and pushing more traffic into the commerce engine; within just 23 months of its launch, content commerce generated Rs7.07bn in NMV in FY25 and Rs12.08bn in the 12 months ended Sep 2025. Across these loops, the platform generates enormous data on preferences, pricing, fulfilment, and content efficacy which it reinvests into algorithmic recommendations, logistics optimisation, and seller insights, raising conversion and reducing friction. These interconnected flywheels are Meesho's real moat: dense liquidity across demand, supply, logistics and creators make matching faster, reduces cost-to-serve, and raises the entry barrier for any competitor who would need to replicate demand scale, seller depth, logistics density, and creator engagement simultaneously.

Figure 9: Meesho's self-reinforcing flywheels



SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

## Industry overview

India's retail landscape is a study in scale meeting fragmentation: a Rs123–135tr (US\$1.4–1.6tr) market by FY30F, propelled by a rising middle class, urbanisation and consumption growth radiating outward from metro cities into Tier-2+ India.


Yet, more than 70% of retail spending will continue to be driven by regional brands and unbranded products, a structural reality shaped by hyper-local preferences, acute price sensitivity, and supply chains riddled with intermediaries. This fragmentation sustains a vast unorganised retail sector that dominates demand but suffers from chronic inefficiencies in sourcing, assortment depth, consistency and store-level operations, limiting its ability to scale. Organised retail, both offline and e-commerce, is gradually formalising this chaos through better logistics, structured supply chains and tech-enabled discovery, with e-commerce emerging as the fastest-growing channel, projected to capture 12–13% of India's retail spend by FY30F.

The sector itself is expected to compound at 20–25% over the next five years, reaching Rs15–18tr (US\$174–214bn), led by non-electronics categories that enjoy a long runway for online penetration. This growth is enabled by digital adoption on the demand side, the steady digitalisation of India's fragmented supplier base and falling logistics costs that make low-ticket fulfilment economically viable.

Monetisation models are broadening as well, from pure commissions to advertising, logistics and financial services, supporting more sustainable unit economics. Two business models have emerged to serve India's divergent consumer needs: convenience-led e-commerce for speed and premium assortment, and value-focused e-commerce for affordability and depth.


The latter is uniquely positioned to expand India's online shopper base by aggregating fragmented supply, offering discovery-led journeys, and relying primarily on advertising revenue, given its low-take-rate structure. Operating on platform-first architectures, value-focused players are inherently more capital-efficient, and global precedents, most notably China, suggest that such models can ultimately define the long-term centre of gravity in large e-commerce ecosystems.

Figure 10: India retail market (Rstr/US\$bn)




SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

Figure 11: Per capita retail spending




SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

Figure 12: India retail market by category (Rstr/US\$bn)




SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

Figure 13: India's retail market split by city tier (Rstr/US\$bn)




SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS


**Figure 14: India retail market by discretionary vs. non-discretionary (Rstr/US\$bn)**



**Figure 15: Global benchmarks of discretionary spending as a % of total retail spending**



**Figure 16: India retail market split by brand type (Rstr/US\$bn)**



**Figure 17: Global benchmarks (Rstr/US\$bn)**





Figure 18: India retail market category split by brand type (Rstr/US\$bn)



## Competitive landscape

For benchmarking Meesho's operating performance, we compared it against a defined peer set of scaled e-commerce platforms and listed multi-category retail companies in India. Scaled players are those with gross GMV or revenue exceeding US\$500m in FY25. Collectively, these players (including Meesho) account for over 85% of India's e-commerce GMV. The broader peer universe also includes organised offline retailers, with at least two product categories contributing over 10% of revenue or GMV. These categories span fashion, BPC, electronics, home & furniture, general merchandise, jewellery, grocery, and pharmaceuticals.

### Scale leadership in orders and users ➤

Meesho is the largest e-commerce platform in India by annual placed orders in both FY25 and the 12 months ended 30 Sep 2025. It also had the highest orders per day among e-commerce players during this period. On a LTM basis, Meesho served ~5.9x more placed orders than the average scaled e-commerce platform.

In FY25, Meesho also recorded the largest number of annual transacting users, representing 23–24% of India's internet-enabled population, demonstrating broad-based user adoption and strong engagement depth.

### Market share gains through faster growth ➤

Over the last two years, Meesho has grown materially faster than India's overall e-commerce industry, resulting in meaningful market share gains in GMV. As of 1HFY26, Meesho reported the highest value of goods sold in the fashion category among both e-commerce and listed multi-category retail peers.

On a category-level basis (LTM Sep 2025), Meesho leads in:

- Placed orders in fashion and home, kitchen & furnishing items.
- Among the top three in beauty & personal care (incl. baby & mother care).

In FY25, Meesho's GMV market share stood at:

- 21–23% in fashion.
- 23–25% in home, kitchen items & furnishing.
- 8–10% in beauty & personal care products.

### User acquisition and engagement leadership ➤

Meesho has been the most downloaded shopping app in India for four consecutive years (FY22–FY25 and 1HFY26). While India's e-commerce shopper base grew by 11–20% between FY23 and FY25, Meesho's annual transacting users increased by ~46%, indicating that a substantial share of incremental shopper addition has accrued to the platform.

Meesho has the highest average minutes per session among the top 10 shopping apps in India (LTM Sep 2025), underlining strong engagement and stickiness.

### Cost leadership and operating efficiency ➤

Meesho continues to operate with one of the lowest cost structures in India's e-commerce ecosystem. It reported the lowest AOV among scaled players (LTM Sep 2025), which aligns with its value e-commerce positioning.


In the same period, its costs to enable sales for sellers (commissions, fulfilment, and platform costs excluding ads) was 35–61% lower than the average for scaled e-commerce platforms. Meesho was also the first platform to offer 0% commission to unbranded sellers (launched in 2021) and the first to achieve US\$1bn GMV under this model.

In FY25, Meesho contributed 29–31% to India's e-commerce shipment volume (excluding hyperlocal), making it the largest shipment generator in the ecosystem.


## Additional competitive advantages ➤

- Deep access to the underserved seller base: Regional and unbranded sellers still contribute only 25–30% to India's e-commerce GMV, an area where Meesho maintains a strong competitive play.
- Strong cash generation: It generated the largest free cash flow among scaled listed e-commerce companies in the LTM period ended 30 Sep 2025.
- Regulatory flexibility: It remains the only scaled e-commerce platform in India (as of Sep 2025) that allows seller onboarding without GST registration, in line with regulations.
- Valmo's logistics advantage: Operates a fully asset-light logistics model, unique among scaled peers. Its average cost per surface shipment (0.5–1kg) is 0.5–11% lower than the peer average (LTM Sep 2025)
- App adoption: Fastest shopping app in India to reach 500m downloads (CY23).

**Figure 19: Placed orders (Meesho vs. other e-commerce players); Meesho orders indexed at 100 units in the last 12 months ended 30 Sep 2025**



**Figure 20: GMV growth from fiscal 2023-2025 wherein fiscal 2023 GMV is indexed at 100 units**



## Financials and valuation

### Revenue, annual transacting users and orders placed

Meesho's revenue from operations is predominantly driven by the logistics fees it charges sellers, followed by advertising income, with logistics contributing the bulk of the topline. Since logistics revenue is linked to **order volume rather than product value**, Meesho's ability to scale its business hinges directly on growing its transacting user base and increasing order frequency. This relationship is clearly reflected in its financial trajectory: **Net revenue rose from Rs57.3bn in FY23 to Rs76.1bn in FY24 (32.8% YoY) and Rs93.9bn in FY25 (23.3% YoY)**, supported by strong user and order momentum. **Annual Transacting Users expanded from 136m to 156m in FY24 and 199m in FY25**, while **placed orders grew from 1.02bn to 1.34bn and further to 1.83bn**, recording robust YoY increase of 31% and 36.7%. As Meesho's model relies on high-volume, low-AOV transactions, sustaining this growth in user adoption and order density remains critical for driving topline expansion.

Figure 21: Revenue from operations (Rsm)




Figure 22: Annual transacting users (m)




Figure 23: Placed orders (m)






Figure 24: Placed orders per ATU




## Expenses and EBITDA

Meesho's cost structure continues to be dominated by **logistics and fulfilment expenses**, which stood at **78.3% of revenue in FY25**, making it the single-largest expense driver. This is precisely where **Valmo** becomes strategically important, its optimisation engine reportedly reduces logistics costs by **0.5–11%** versus peers. However, we expect Meesho to **pass on most of these efficiency gains back to sellers** to preserve its low-price positioning; any meaningful increase in logistics fees would risk pushing its pricing closer to Flipkart or Amazon, undermining its core value proposition. As a result, we do not expect logistics and fulfilment costs to materially decline, as a proportion of revenue, in the near term.


Employee costs should benefit from operating leverage as scale improves, while **advertising expenses (6.9% of sales in FY25)** are likely to remain elevated, given Meesho's dependence on growing Annual Transacting Users and increasing orders per user to drive top-line growth. With these structural cost pressures, **EBITDA margin remained negative at -6.2% in FY25**, and any improvement is likely to be gradual rather than immediate.

**Figure 25: Logistics and fulfilment expenses (Rsm)**

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS


**Figure 26: Employee expenses (Rsm)**

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

**Figure 27: Advertisement expenses (Rsm)**

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

Figure 28: EBITDA (Rsm) and EBITDA margin



## Valuation and rating

On valuation front, Meesho performs attractively when compared to listed new-age peers such as Eternal, Swiggy, and Nykaa. Its EV/sales multiple is meaningfully lower, especially relative to Nykaa, which operates in a comparable e-commerce landscape. However, despite the seemingly inexpensive valuation, we remain cautious. The value-commerce model carries inherent complexities in unit economics, and Meesho will likely require more time to optimise both its core e-commerce flywheel and the Valmo-enabled supply chain. Achieving sustainable profitability hinges on a delicate balance, driving supply-chain efficiencies while still passing on benefits to sellers, scaling ad-based monetisation, and maintaining Meesho's sharp price positioning.

If executed well, Meesho could emulate the trajectory of global value e-commerce leaders like Pinduoduo or Shopee. We assign SUBSCRIBE rating to Meesho's initial public offer (IPO) for short-term gains, supported by an attractive valuation at 5.3x market capitalisation/sales. However, over the long run, value e-commerce will continue to face structural challenges. Achieving sustainable EBITDA breakeven remains a distant objective, given the inherent complexity of balancing supply-chain optimisation with passing on benefits to sellers, scaling ad-led monetisation, and preserving Meesho's sharp price positioning.

Figure 29: Peer comparison

	Meesho	Nykaa	Swiggy	Eternal
CMP (Rs/share)	111	256	402	296
Revenue from operations (Rs m)	93,900	79,500	1,52,270	2,02,430
EBITDA (Rs m)	-5790	4770	-27,870	6370
Market Cap. (Rs m)	5,00,960	7,31,310	10,02,450	28,56,470
EV (Rs m)	4,53,830	7,43,240	10,10,060	28,81,910
EBITDA margin (%)	-6.2	6	-18.3	3.1
RoE (%)	-50.9	5.1	-30.6	1.7
RoCE (%)	-2	10.4	-29.3	2.8
Market cap./sales (x)	5.3	9.2	6.6	14.1

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

## Management

**Vidit Aatrey** serves as the chairperson, managing director and chief executive officer of Meesho. Mr. Aatrey co-founded the company in 2015 and has been on its board since inception. He holds a B.Tech in Electrical Engineering from IIT Delhi. He leads the executive team and oversees strategy, key initiatives, operational execution and long-term growth. Prior to founding Meesho, he worked with ITC and InMobi. He has been recognised in Forbes Asia's 30 Under 30 (2018), Forbes India's 30 Under 30 (2018), Entrepreneur Magazine's 35 Under 35 (2019), and Fortune India's 40 Under 40 (2021, 2024, 2025).

**Sanjeev Kumar** is the whole-time director and chief technology officer at Meesho. A co-founder of the platform, he joined the board in 2015. Kumar holds a B.Tech in Electrical Engineering from IIT Delhi and is responsible for driving Meesho's technology roadmap, platform scalability, security and infrastructure efficiency. He previously worked with Sony Corporation and has been featured in Forbes Asia's 30 Under 30 (2018), Forbes India's 30 Under 30 (2018), Fortune India's 40 Under 40 (2021, 2024) and The Economic Times 40 Under 40 (2024).

**Mohit Bhatnagar** serves as a non-executive non-independent director, representing Peak XV Partners. He has served on the board of Meesho Inc. since 2018 and joined Meesho Ltd.'s board in 2025. Mr. Bhatnagar holds an engineering degree in electronics from University of Bombay, an MS in electrical engineering from Virginia Tech, and an MBA from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is a designated partner at Peak XV Partners Advisors India LLP and has been associated with the Peak XV (formerly Sequoia Capital India & SEA) ecosystem since 2006.

**Mukul Arora** is a non-executive non-independent director, nominated by Elevation Capital. He has been a part of the board since 2025, after earlier serving on the board of Meesho Inc. since 2018. Mr. Arora holds a bachelor's degree in computer engineering from University of Delhi and a PGDM from IIM Lucknow. He is currently associated with Light Ray Advisors LLP and was previously with McKinsey & Company. He received The Economic Times Start-Up Awards 2024 'Midas Touch' recognition.

**Rohit Bhagat** serves as an independent director at Meesho. He joined the company's board in 2025 after serving as an independent director at Meesho Inc. since 2023. Bhagat holds a B.Tech in mechanical engineering from IIT Delhi, an MS in engineering from University of Texas, and an MBA from Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. He has also completed Stanford University's Directors' Consortium Program. He is currently on the board of PhonePe and previously served as senior managing director and chairman of BlackRock's Asia-Pacific business.

**Hari Shanker Bhartia** is an independent director at Meesho. He joined the board in 2025 following his previous role as an independent director at Meesho Inc. Mr. Bhartia holds a B.Tech in chemical engineering from IIT Delhi. He is the co-founder and co-chairman of the Jubilant Bhartia Group and holds leadership roles across Jubilant Pharmova, Jubilant FoodWorks, and Jubilant Ingrevia.

**Surojit Chatterjee** serves as an independent director at Meesho. He has been a part of the board since 2025, after previously serving on Meesho Inc.'s board. Chatterjee holds a B.Tech (Hons.) in computer science and engineering from IIT Kharagpur, an MS in computer science from SUNY Buffalo, and an MBA from MIT. He is the founder and CEO of EMA Unlimited Inc. His previous experience includes leadership roles at Coinbase, Flipkart, Oracle and Symantec. He also serves as an independent director at Atos.net.

**Kimsuka Narasimhan** is an independent director at Meesho, appointed in 2025. She holds a Bachelor of Commerce degree from University of Madras and is a qualified cost accountant and chartered accountant. She currently serves on the board of Bharti Airtel and brings prior experience from PepsiCo India and Kimberly-Clark Asia Pacific.

## BY THE NUMBERS

Profit & Loss			
(Rs mn)	Mar-23A	Mar-24A	Mar-25F
<b>Total Net Revenues</b>	<b>57,345</b>	<b>76,151</b>	<b>93,899</b>
<b>Gross Profit</b>	<b>57,345</b>	<b>76,151</b>	<b>93,899</b>
<b>Operating EBITDA</b>	<b>(18,037)</b>	<b>(4,941)</b>	<b>(5,785)</b>
Depreciation And Amortisation	300	581	340
<b>Operating EBIT</b>	<b>(18,337)</b>	<b>(5,523)</b>	<b>(6,125)</b>
Financial Income/(Expense)	13	64	69
Pretax Income/(Loss) from Assoc.			
Non-Operating Income/(Expense)	1,632	2,441	5,110
<b>Profit Before Tax (pre-EI)</b>	<b>(16,719)</b>	<b>(3,145)</b>	<b>(1,084)</b>
Exceptional Items		(131)	(13,464)
<b>Pre-tax Profit</b>	<b>(16,719)</b>	<b>(3,276)</b>	<b>(14,549)</b>
Taxation	-	-	24,868
Exceptional Income - post-tax			
<b>Profit After Tax</b>	<b>(16,719)</b>	<b>(3,276)</b>	<b>(39,417)</b>
Minority Interests			
Preferred Dividends			
FX Gain/(Loss) - post tax			
Other Adjustments - post-tax			
<b>Net Profit</b>	<b>(16,719)</b>	<b>(3,276)</b>	<b>(39,417)</b>
Recurring Net Profit			
<b>Fully Diluted Recurring Net Profit</b>	<b>(16,719)</b>	<b>(3,276)</b>	<b>(39,417)</b>

Cash Flow			
(Rs mn)	Mar-23A	Mar-24A	Mar-25F
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>(16,719)</b>	<b>(3,276)</b>	<b>(14,549)</b>
Cash Flow from Invt. & Assoc.			
Change In Working Capital	(6,308)	4,680	15,772
(Incr)/Decr in Total Provisions	300	581	340
Other Non-Cash (Income)/Expense		-	-
Other Operating Cashflow	690	2,256	6,732
Net Interest (Paid)/Received	(946)	(1,948)	(2,535)
Tax Paid	(98)	(129)	(366)
<b>Cashflow From Operations</b>	<b>(23,082)</b>	<b>2,164</b>	<b>5,394</b>
Capex	(365)	(347)	(229)
Disposals Of FAs/subsidiaries			
Acq. Of Subsidiaries/investments			
Other Investing Cashflow	5,349	(1,310)	(26,124)
<b>Cash Flow From Investing</b>	<b>4,984</b>	<b>(1,656)</b>	<b>(26,353)</b>
Debt Raised/(repaid)	-	-	-
Proceeds From Issue Of Shares	-	-	22,966
Shares Repurchased			
Dividends Paid	-	-	-
Preferred Dividends			
Other Financing Cashflow	(118)	(114)	(1,913)
<b>Cash Flow From Financing</b>	<b>(118)</b>	<b>(114)</b>	<b>21,053</b>
Total Cash Generated	(18,216)	393	94
<b>Free Cashflow To Equity</b>	<b>(21,775)</b>	<b>4,317</b>	<b>10,320</b>
<b>Free Cashflow To Firm</b>	<b>(23,364)</b>	<b>1,996</b>	<b>5,912</b>

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

## BY THE NUMBERS...cont'd

Balance Sheet			
(Rs mn)	Mar-23A	Mar-24A	Mar-25F
Total Cash And Equivalents	965	1,404	1,471
Total Debtors	4	2	5
Inventories			
Total Other Current Assets	25,425	30,268	66,398
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>26,395</b>	<b>31,673</b>	<b>67,873</b>
Fixed Assets	231	523	516
Total Investments	2,951		
Intangible Assets	219	16	4
Total Other Non-Current Assets	8,738	9,398	3,867
<b>Total Non-current Assets</b>	<b>12,139</b>	<b>9,937</b>	<b>4,388</b>
Short-term Debt	-	-	-
Current Portion of Long-Term Debt			
Total Creditors	8,342	8,749	10,710
Other Current Liabilities	5,357	9,838	46,460
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>13,699</b>	<b>18,588</b>	<b>57,170</b>
Total Long-term Debt	-	-	-
Hybrid Debt - Debt Component			
Total Other Non-Current Liabilities	115	726	636
<b>Total Non-current Liabilities</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>726</b>	<b>636</b>
Total Provisions	-	-	-
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>13,814</b>	<b>19,314</b>	<b>57,806</b>
Shareholders Equity	24,719	22,296	14,455
Minority Interests	-	-	-
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b>24,719</b>	<b>22,296</b>	<b>14,455</b>

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

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Definition: The stock's total return is expected to exceed 10% over the next 12 months.

Add The stock's total return is expected to be between 0% and positive 10% over the next 12 months.

Hold The stock's total return is expected to fall below 0% or more over the next 12 months.

Reduce *The total expected return of a stock is defined as the sum of the: (i) percentage difference between the target price and the current price and (ii) the forward net dividend yields of the stock. Stock price targets have an investment horizon of 12 months.*

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Overweight A Neutral rating means stocks in the sector have, on a market cap-weighted basis, a neutral absolute recommendation.

Neutral An Underweight rating means stocks in the sector have, on a market cap-weighted basis, a negative absolute recommendation.

**Country Ratings**

Definition: An Overweight rating means investors should be positioned with an above-market weight in this country relative to benchmark.

Overweight A Neutral rating means investors should be positioned with a neutral weight in this country relative to benchmark.

Neutral An Underweight rating means investors should be positioned with a below-market weight in this country relative to benchmark.